RESEARCH
I study how states translate political objectives into the effective use of national power under strategic constraint. My work centers on military force—examining limited war, coercion, and escalation among nuclear-armed rivals and rising powers—while also analyzing the institutional and signaling dynamics that shape strategic behavior.
Across projects, I investigate the limits of statecraft: when calibrated uses of force and diplomacy can secure limited aims, and when escalation control becomes fragile, unstable, or politically unsustainable.
Limited War and Escalation
A central strand of my scholarship analyzes the feasibility of limited war under nuclear conditions. Drawing on recurrent crises in South Asia and the Indo-Pacific, I examine how leaders pursue constrained objectives without triggering uncontrolled escalation.
This research evaluates the credibility of limited aims, the signaling logic of coercion, and the structural constraints imposed by geography, military modernization, and alliance politics. It assesses when doctrines of limited war are politically and operationally viable—and when the dynamics of escalation overwhelm strategic intent.
Security Assistance and the Politics of Intervention
A second strand develops a principal–agent framework for understanding the political dynamics of security assistance and counterinsurgency. Military interventions designed to build partner capacity are shaped by divergent preferences between external patrons and local governments.
This work highlights the limits of leverage in asymmetric partnerships and contributes to debates on proxy warfare, security force assistance, and the long-term sustainability of intervention.
Strategic Signaling and Institutional Constraint
My research also examines how political institutions and signaling shape the deployment of national power. Using original data on leadership travel and parliamentary oversight, I analyze how rising powers allocate diplomatic attention, signal foreign policy priorities, and mediate the use of force through domestic institutions.
India’s defense modernization and crisis behavior provide a contemporary setting for examining how institutional incentives and political accountability condition strategic adaptation under external threat.
Research Approach
Methodologically, my work combines qualitative case analysis, archival research, elite interviews, and original data collection. Across domains, I connect theoretical debates in strategic studies with empirically grounded analysis of contemporary security challenges.