February 13, 1952

Honorable Thomas E. Dewey
Executive Chamber
Albany, N.Y.

My dear Governor:

Your Philippine chapter reached me Saturday afternoon, and I went over it with John Malby, who is on the Philippine desk in the State Department, Saturday evening. There are a few odds and ends of things which you may want to straighten out a bit, and Mr. Malby will write to you today from Washington, so that your draft, along with our comments, should be in your hands at Albany tomorrow. It is very interesting reading, and I shall look forward with much anticipation to the publication date of your book.

I have been wanting to come up to Albany to talk with you about your trip, but this is only my third time in New York since our return from the Philippines, and again today the occasion for my coming up is another luncheon, this time for the New Zealand Prime Minister.

It occurred to me that you might be interested in having a bit of background on how the Bell Mission came into being. I first went to the Philippines in May of 1949. I was so appalled by what I found there during the first ten days of my stay, that I went up to Tokyo to have a talk with General MacArthur, and then I returned to Washington to report on what I had found. I later came to the conclusion that it was imperative that a top-flight economic mission should come out to the Philippines to take a fresh look at it. President Truman and the State Department approved the idea, and I then proposed it to President Quirino at our Baguio Embassy residence after dinner on Christmas night of 1949. I proposed it as an American mission. President Quirino insisted on a joint American-Philippine mission. I was insistent upon an American mission, not only because I felt that a completely independent American mission would be best qualified to do the job, but because I wanted to use the report as a basis for remedial measures which I knew were vital to the well being of the Philippines. In urging an American mission, as distinguished from a joint mission, upon President Quirino, I argued that the report of an American mission would be much more readily accepted by our Congress. President Quirino and his advisers, I found, were fearful of a highly critical report, and it was late in
May before Quirino reluctantly accepted the American mission, with the attendant loss of several prior and valuable months.

I had urged the appointment of Dan Bell, not only because of his well-known competence and integrity, but because of the high esteem in which he was, and is, held by our Congress. President Quirino was for a time so bitterly resentful over my insistence upon a purely American mission that I had reason to believe that he might even ask for my recall, and I so advised the Department. I was at the same time urging the consolidation of the Constabulary and the Armed Forces, and the replacement of General Nagelon, the then Secretary of Defense, with a new Secretary of Defense, and also the replacement of General Castenada, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, and General Ramos, Chief of Staff of the Constabulary, and that did not help the situation any. Both Castenada and Ramos were close personal friends of President Quirino, and had been of very substantial help to him in the 1949 presidential election. Nagelon was a man of great personal courage and great integrity, but without political backing, and therefore, unable to cope at all with Castenada and Ramos. Castenada and Ramos have, as you know, been retired from their respective positions, but Ramos, strange enough -- or not strangely enough -- was made the head of the Philippine National Bureau of Investigation, which is the counterpart of our F.B.I.

The filing of the Bell report was the basis for the establishment of an E.C.A. mission to the Philippines. E.C.A., however, has not been too fortunate in the selection of its administrators. The first lad they sent over was on a temporary basis, and then he was succeeded at just about the time you visited Manila by Dr. Renne, and Renne is now being brought back, and Ty Wood, at E.C.A., and his associates, are now desperately looking for a really top-flight man to send out to head the mission. If you have any ideas on that subject, I shall be deeply grateful.

John Molby will tell you in his letter today that if you do not mind too much, we would prefer that you not say that Magsaysay was appointed as a result of American pressure. President Quirino is already very sensitive on that subject, as a result of the praise Magsaysay has had in Time and the Saturday Evening Post, and rather generally, and I do not want to add any fuel to that fire. There was very grave danger of Magsaysay’s removal immediately after the last November 13th elections, and if he were to be forced out, the situation in the Philippines might well again very rapidly deteriorate.

Sincerely,
February 15, 1952

Honorable Myron B. Cowan  
2122 Massachusetts Avenue  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Enclosed is a fourth draft of the Philippine chapter of my book. I think there are some typos and minor corrections but do not pay any attention to those.

I should be grateful to have your comment and of course that of Ambassador Romulo in accordance with our conversation this morning.

I do hope Prime Minister Holland will find it possible to come up to the Mansion and spend a night and that you can persuade Mrs. Cowan to come with you.

As it happened, my delayed schedule put me into Wellington the night when the Prime Minister was opening his election campaign in Christchurch, so while I had a nice telephone conversation with him I did not see him during my stay in New Zealand. It would be grand to have a visit with all of you.

If you can come I will have a limousine waiting for you or send down a State Conservation Department plane if you care to use it.

With warm regards and cordial appreciation,

I am

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]